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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HKSAR COURTS 
RODAMUSHKAT* 
The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong notwithstanding, courts in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will continue to 
face questions about the application and enforcement of international law in 
the Territory in a wide range of areas, including human rights, treatment of 
aliens, diplomatic/consular immunities, protection and preservation of the 
natural environment, jurisdiction over crime/extradition, maritime law, 
commercial transactions, and transportation. This Article will review1 local 
judicial approaches in light of available international practice2 with the aim 
of extrapolating the relevant principles that will govern the relationship be-
tween international law and the domestic law in post-1997 Hong Kong. 
I. COMPETENCE OF THE LOCAL COURTS TO DECIDE 
QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Like their counterparts in other countries, Hong Kong courts are not 
constitutionally or legally impeded in the application of international law to 
issues arising in the course of proceedings over which they exercise juris-
diction in accordance with the domestic legal system. Nonetheless, in com-
mon with their British counterparts, local judges have displayed some re-
luctance to rule on questions of international law3 because of the wrong 
* Professor of Law, Univ. of Hong Kong; LL.B. Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem; LL.M. 
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1. This Article is partially based on the author's own study in ONE COUNTRY, Two 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES ch. 6 (Hong Kong: HKU Press 1997). 
2. This stems primarily from the INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE, 1996 
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (submitted to the 67th Conference of 
the International Law Association, held in Helsinki, Aug. 12-17, 1996) [hereinafter ILA 
REPORT], which in turn is grounded in replies to an information-gathering questionnaire re-
ceived from ILA national branches in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America. 
3. Note, however, the exceptional lack of timidity displayed in earlier days by a Hong 
Kong court in In the Matter of an Arbitration Between the Osaka Shosen Kaisha & the 
Owners of the Steamship "Prometheus" (1906-08) 2 H.K.L.R. 207 (applying customary 
international law in the interpretation of the term "contraband of war," in a contract be-
tween private parties). 
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assumption that international law is more like foreign affairs than law, 
thereby precluding their involvement.4 Particular inhibition is evident when 
matters of State, including either acts of State or facts of State, seem to be 
involved. As traditionally perceived, municipal courts will accept acts of 
"high" policy that the Executive performs in the course of its relations with 
another State (such as a declaration of war, an annexation of territory, or an 
act of reprisal) and will not question their validity despite an apparent breach 
of international law. The courts also consider binding the Executive's af-
firmation of certain legal situations in the international sphere (for example, 
recognition of foreign States or governments, territorial sovereignty, exis-
tence of a state of war, or entitlement to diplomatic status), irrespective of 
whether the certificate that the Executive issues accurately reflects the inter-
national legal stance. 
Still, the respective domains of the executive and judicial branches of 
government are by no means rigidly defined. As illustrated in a recent case, 
a United Kingdom court is willing and able to determine on its own a matter 
previously regarded as "peculiarly within the cognisance of the Executive," 
namely the status of an alleged foreign government.5 By the same token, as a 
general rule in common law countries, the courts decide what constitutes an 
"act of State," interpret the relevant certification, and rule on its legal conse-
quences. 
Similarly, while the courts acknowledge that all States are sovereign 
equals, thereby requiring that each State respect the public acts of every 
other State it recognizes,6 such domestic courts are not necessarily precluded 
4. See Colin Warbrick, International Law and Domestic Law: Ministerial Power, 38 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 965, 968 (1989) (referring to Judge Henry's statement in the 
"Cambodian Embassy Case" that "courts should not engage themselves in cases involving 
questions of international law between States because of the risk of conflict with the Ex-
ecutive, even if this excluded the courts from cases that only affect the rights of individuals 
in exceptional cases . . . or by a sidewind"). See also ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND 
PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How W E USE IT 206-07 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 
(for the suggestion that such an attitude stems from a distinct "legal culture"— 
characterized by a lack of background in international law among judges—which manifests 
itself in ways varying from contempt for everything to do with international law to strenu-
ous efforts "not to decide points of international law but to locate the ratio decidendi of the 
judgment on more familiar ground"). 
5. See Somalia (Republic) v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) S.A. [1993] 1 All. 
E.R. 371 (H.C.) (outlining the criteria that a court should apply in assessing the status of 
the entity claiming to be a foreign sovereign government—i.e., legality, effectiveness, and 
in marginal cases, international recognition—independently of, and not bound by, the U.K. 
government view; "dealings by the British government" are considered merely another 
factor that is taken into account). It has been suggested that the case "opens up the possi-
bility that a U.K. court will accept the sovereignty of a foreign government even if the U.K. 
government would, as a matter of policy, be opposed to such a move" (in contrast to the 
previously expressed belief that in matters concerning foreign relations the State "cannot 
speak with two voices"). See MARTIN DIXON & ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, CASES & 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (London: Blackstone Press Limited 2d ed. 1995). 
6. See locus classicus decision Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1887): 
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from determining whether and to what extent effect should be given to such 
acts of the foreign government7—particularly where such acts manifestly 
violate international law.8 
Clearly, a complete judicial abstention over transactions of sovereign 
States finds little support among international jurists and commentators.9 
Held as particularly flawed is the premise that courts should refrain from 
rendering a judgment that would offend a foreign State, so as to avoid re-
taliation by the foreign State against the national interests of the forum State 
or embarrassment to the national Executive.10 Not surprisingly, a 1993 
resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International recommends that 
national courts assert their competence to examine the congruity of foreign 
laws with international law and "decline to give effect to foreign public acts 
that violate international law.'"1 
Nor for that matter can justification be adduced for any "avoidance 
doctrine" grounded in a purportedly "general principle. . . inherent in the 
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of 
grievances, by reason of such acts, must be obtained through the means open 
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 
7. The acts in question are mostly those by the foreign government against its own 
subjects with respect to property situated in its own territory. 
8. Although judging the acts of another State by the forum's national laws may be an 
abuse of the other's sovereignty, no such infringement occurs if the validity of those acts is 
determined by international law. Note the flexible, case-by-case approach encouraged in 
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Note also that, in what is 
known as the "Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961), the U.S. Congress directed the courts not to give effect to foreign acts of State 
that violated international law by taking without compensation the property of U.S. nation-
als. In the U.K., a court held that Iranian legislative acts of nationalization were contrary to 
international law. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary) [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246 
(Aden Sup. Ct.). In Oppenheimerv. Cattermole [1976] App. Cas. 249, 277-78, Lord Cross, 
speaking for the majority, said the following: 
A judge should, of course, be very slow to refuse to give effect to the legislation 
of a foreign State in any sphere in which, according to accepted principles of 
international law, the foreign State has jurisdiction . . . But I think . . . that it is 
part of the public policy of this country that our courts should give effect to 
clearly established rules of international law. 
9. See Benedetto Conforti (Rapporteur), The Activities of National Judges and the In-
ternational Relations of their State, Preliminary Report, 65 Y.B. INST. INT'L L. 371, 393-
406 (1993) (cited in Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit Inter-
national's Resolution on the Activities of National Courts and the International Relations 
of Their State, 5 EUR. J. INT'LL. 423, 430 n.35 (1993)). 
10. See, for example, the observation that the risk of the forum State being embar-
rassed by a decision is negligible, and that the Executive actually may prefer judicial inter-
vention that relieves it of the necessity to make a politically difficult choice. Id. at 437 
n.77. 
11. Id. at 437 (citing Resolution on the Activities of National Courts and the Interna-
tional Relations of Their State, art. 3 (Milan: Sept. 7, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Resolution]). 
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very nature of the judicial process" or a "lack of judicial or manageable 
standards."12 Similar reservations may be expressed for an embedded reluc-
tance by judges to review governmental and legislative action in the light of 
international legal norms,13 which is frequently subsumed under the doctrine 
of "non-justiciability of political questions."14 Indeed, judges may incur in-
ternational responsibility if they fail to scrutinize the legality of Executive 
acts with reference to binding legal obligations.15 
HKSAR judges, therefore, should adhere to prevailing international ju-
dicial norms and not "decline competence on the basis of the political nature 
of the question."16 Although constrained from exercising jurisdiction over 
"defence and foreign affairs," while also being required to obtain an Execu-
tive certificate on "questions of fact concerning acts of State whenever such 
questions arise in the adjudication of cases,"17 HKSAR judges must preserve 
the judicial independence bestowed upon them in both the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration18 and the Region's Basic Law19 against attempts to usurp court 
authority.20 
12. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer & Occidental Petroleum Corp. [1981] 3 All. E.R. 
616, 628, 633(H.L.). 
13. See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of Interna-
tional Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. JJST'L L. 159 (1993). 
14. For a forceful attack on the doctrine, see THOMAS FRANCK, POLITICAL QUES-
TIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1992). 
15. Note that "[t]he Judiciary and the courts are organs of the State and they generate 
responsibility in the same way as other categories of officials . . . Like the executive organs 
and the legislature, the courts may be instrumental in the misapplication of treaty standards 
[and international law in general]." IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS—STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY (PART I) 144 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983). 
16. 1993 Resolution, supra note 11, art. 2. 
17. See Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, cap. 484, § 4. Note that a poten-
tial reference, for interpretation purposes, to the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress, Basic Law, infra note 19, art. 158, is confined to provisions of the Basic 
Law "concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, 
or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region"—and does 
not inhibit the courts' general power of application or interpretation of international law. 
18. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland & the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion] . 
19. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law]. 
20. Note, however, the rather self-restrictive approach adopted by HKSAR judges with 
respect to the jurisdictional competence of the HKSAR courts in a recent decision on the 
legality of the Provisional Legislature and the integrity of the Common Law following the 
change of sovereignty: HKSAR v. Ma Wai-Kwan, David & others [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761, 
780, 781 (C.A.) (Reservation of Question of Law No. 1 of 1997) (per Patrick Chan, C.J.: 
"[R]egional courts have no jurisdiction to query the validity of any legislation or acts 
passed by the Sovereign" [although] "courts do have the jurisdiction to examine the exis-
tence (as opposed to the validity) of the acts of the Sovereign or its delegate."). While these 
dicta might have been generated by the special political circumstances surrounding the 
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II. STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE LOCAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
In line with common law tradition, which derives from separation of 
powers constraints,21 a distinction has been drawn in Hong Kong's judicial 
practice between treaty-based law and customary international law with re-
spect to their role and rank in the domestic legal system. Accordingly, con-
ventional international law (consisting of treaties, conventions, and other 
international agreements) requires formal incorporation. By contrast, cus-
tomary international law forms part of the law of the land and is, therefore, 
binding without the need for legislative transformation.22 Once incorporated, 
treaties become legislation like any other and may be trumped only by sub-
sequent contrary statutes. Similarly, customary international law as part of 
the law of the land enjoys no special rank under the local hierarchy of legal 
norms and would, therefore, give way in the face of a later conflicting law. 
Given that the Territory's legal system is to be maintained generally in 
accordance with the "one country, two systems" framework,23 the above in-
ternational/domestic law interrelationship should be perpetuated even after 
the 1997 transfer of sovereignty. However, if Chinese conceptions in this 
Provisional Legislature, and hence stem from an isolated case, concerns have been raised 
regarding the precedential implications for the SAR's high degree of autonomy. See Edito-
rial, Provisional Verdict, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 16; Yash Ghai, Dark 
Days for Our Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 17; Linda Choy, Self-
imposed Limits Could Sacrifice Autonomy, Law Academic Warns, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
July 30, 1997, at 6; Linda Choy & Genevieve Ku, Fears as "Bulwark of Basic Law Falls," 
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 7; and Angela Li, Bar Chief Hits at "Backward-
Looking" Example in Provisional Legislature Case, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 
1997, at 6. For a sustained critical analysis of the judgment, see Johannes Chan, The Juris-
diction and Legality of the Provisional Legislative Council, 27 H.K.L.J. 374 (1997). 
21. Under the constitutional law and practice of several common law countries, treaty-
making power is vested with the executive branch of the government, with no formal sanc-
tioning required by the legislature. Consequently, it is thought that direct applicability of 
treaties would allow government to introduce norms into the domestic legal system, 
thereby usurping the legislative function. Arguably, however, the separation of powers 
principle need not be compromised, since the legislature may still exercise a supervisory or 
supervening power. Note that, in the U.S. (a common law country), international agree-
ments entered into under the President's power to conclude Executive agreements—which 
do not require the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate—are declared under the U.S. Con-
stitution to be part of the supreme law of the land. 
22. This is so, in so far as reception would require a change in the law, a levy on pub-
lic funds, or an addition to powers of the Executive not already possessed by it. Possible 
exceptions are treaties of cession, treaties affecting belligerent rights, and declaratory trea-
ties, which merely restate customary international law. Note, however, that by virtue of the 
"act of State" doctrine, "even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants 
should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to these inhabitants to enforce these 
stipulations in the municipal courts. The right to enforce remains only with the high con-
tracting parties." Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India (Ind. App) L.R. 51, 
360 (P.C. 1924). 
23. This framework was laid down under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 
18, and elaborated in Basic Law, supra note 19. 
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regard were to prevail in the HKSAR, u a more "incorporationist attitude 
towards international law"25 could arguably be expected. Upon becoming ef-
fective, treaties under such a framework26 would have direct internal appli-
cation (imposing respective obligations on all "government organs, includ-
ing the executive and the judiciary")27 "without the need for any additional 
enactments to transform them to domestic law."28 Based on a considerable 
number of Chinese legislative illustrations,29 the likely outcome in case of a 
24. Such a reason would not be grounded in the postulated framework of "one country, 
two systems." 
25. Ivan Shearer, Finding and Applying International Law by National Courts, Paper 
Presented at the Conference on Constitutions in an Interdependent World: The Impact of 
Internationalization on Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region, held in Macau, Nov. 18-20, 
1996, at 4. Shearer uses the expression to describe the position of countries belonging to 
the Civil Law tradition, whereby "conventional international law is [directly] applicable 
provided the relevant treaty or convention has been promulgated in the manner required by 
the constitution." Id. He cites the regional examples of Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Ko-
rea, Macao, People's Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
26. It should be emphasized that, under the Sino-British Joint Declaration (annex I, art 
XI), supra note 18, "[t]he application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or become a party 
shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance with the circum-
stances and needs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and after seeking the 
views of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government" (emphasis added). 
27. Wang Tieya, The Status of Treaties in the Chinese Legal System, 1 J. CHINESE & 
COMP. L. 1, 5-6 (1995). Examples relied upon include a Notice on the Accession by China 
to the Hague Convention and Montreal Convention issued by the State Council in 1980, 
stating that "[i]t is hoped that every region and every relevant department will conscien-
tiously implement the relevant provisions of the aforesaid international conventions"; and a 
Notice on the Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by Chinese Issued by the Supreme People's Court in 
1987, requiring people's courts at various levels to "earnestly follow and implement" this 
Convention. 
28. Tieya, supra note 27, at 16 n.16 (citing Li Haopei, A General Treatise on the Law 
of Treaties). Note, however, that Regulations have been enacted to implement the 1961 Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations [Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 1986 and Regulations on 
Consular Privileges and Immunities 1990]. In addition, the Basic Law of the H.K.S.A.R. 
has presumably been promulgated to give effect to the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 
29. Several laws passed since the early 1980s contain provisions that affirm the supe-
rior status of treaties. Most notably, article 189 of the 1982 Civil Procedure Law ("[W]here 
an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China contains 
provisions differing from those found in this Law, the provisions of the international treaty 
shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which China has announced reservations."); 
1986 General Principles of Civil Law, art. 142 (covering "all civil laws") ("[W]here an in-
ternational treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China contains pro-
visions differing from those in the civil laws of the People's Republic of China, the provi-
sions of the international treaty shall apply, with the exception of those on which the 
People's Republic of China has declared reservations."); 1985 Foreign Economic Contract, 
art. 6 ("[W]here an international treaty which is relevant to a contract, and which the Peo-
ple's Republic of China has concluded or joined, has provisions different from the law of 
the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail, with 
the exception of those on which the People's Republic of China has declared reserva-
tions."). For these and other similar provisions in other laws covering a wide range of sub-
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conflict between treaties and domestic law is that the former would be given 
priority. 
The adoption of assumed Chinese practices might also give rise to the 
claim of an elevated status for customary international law in light of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) Principles of Civil Law, which include in 
Article 142(1) the stipulation that "[international practice may be applied to 
matters for which neither the law of the People's Republic of China nor any 
international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of 
China has any provisions."30 "International practice" is nowhere defined, 
however. When read in conjunction with another provision (Article 150), 
which conditions its application upon conformity with the "public interest of 
the PRC," the term appears to differ significantly from customary interna-
tional law as commonly understood.31 
It is difficult to speculate on the possible legal outcome if a situation 
were to arise where PRC national laws applicable to the HKSAR were in-
consistent with China's treaty obligations; however, it is clear that no shelter 
can be sought in the municipal order to evade the legal consequences that 
follow from the basic subordination of domestic law to public international 
law on the interstate level.32 Indeed, as declared in the Rules on Certain 
Questions in the Handling of Foreign-Related Cases, issued by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in the PRC, 
[w]here a conflict arises between domestic law and certain internal rules 
on the one hand and treaty obligations which China has undertaken on 
the other, relevant provisions of the international treaties shall apply. 
According to general principles of international law, China should not re-
fuse to perform obligations undertaken under me provisions of interna-
tional treaties on the ground of [different] provisions in domestic law. 
ject matters (civil law, civil procedure law, administrative litigation law, fisheries law, 
postal affairs, trade marks, foreign economic contracts, entry and exit of aliens, frontier 
health regulation, transport on inland rivers, taxation, environmental protection, and pro-
tection of wild animals), see Tieya, supra note 27, at 8-10. See also Li Zhaojie, The Effect 
of Treaties in the Municipal Law of the People's Republic of China: Practice and Prob-
lems, ASIAN Y.B. INT'LL. 185, 217-19 (1994). 
30. 2 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA COMPILED BY THE LEGISLATIVE 
AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS 
225, 248 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press 1983-1986). 
31. For the view that customary international law in the Western sense (which is still 
embedded in colonialism and capitalism and is too vague) is not part of Chinese domestic 
law, see Chinese writings cited in HUNGDAH CHIU, CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-MAO ERA, 1978-1987, at 24 n.87 (Baltimore: University of 
Maryland School of Law, Contemporary Asian Studies Series 1988). 
32. See generally 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.39/27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty."); see also 1949 Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
States, art. 13, Y.B. INT'LL. COMM'N286, 288 (1949). ("[Every State] has the duty to carry 
out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, 
and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to 
perform this duty."). 
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This is good both for the maintenance of China's prestige and for the 
protection of lawful rights and interests of Chinese nationals abroad.33 
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE LOCAL COURTS 
A. Customary International Law 
Under the legal system prior to July 1, 1997, customary international 
law could be adopted into Hong Kong law via the Application of English 
Law Ordinance 1966, which provided that "the common law and rules of 
equity shall be in force in Hong Kong, so far as they may be applicable to 
the circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants and subject to such modi-
fications thereto as circumstances may require."34 As a consequence, English 
law received by the Territory included the common law doctrine described 
by Blackstone in the often-quoted passage from his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, that "the law of nations, in its fullest extent, was part of 
the law of the land."35 Coterminous with this doctrine, rules of international 
law are incorporated into English law automatically and are considered to be 
part of English law unless they conflict with an Act of Parliament. Indeed, 
such an "incorporation doctrine" has been acted upon by the courts repeat-
edly, thereby creating an established rule of English law. Hence, as a com-
mon law derivative, customary international law would continue to apply in 
the HKSAR according to the prescription that "the laws previously in force 
in Hong Kong [i.e., the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordi-
nate legislation, and customary law] shall be maintained."36 
Were the reception of customary international law to stem exclusively 
from the common law, local courts might feel bound to espouse the defini-
tions and interpretations that English judges have given to international 
customs.37 Under such a framework, local courts would also be precluded 
33. Tieya, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
34. 9 LAWS OF HONG KONG, ch. 88, § 3. 
35. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ONTHELAWS OF ENGLAND bk. IV, ch. 5, at 67 (15th 
ed. 1809). 
36. Sino-British Joint Declaration, supra note 18, annex I, art II; Basic Law, supra 
note 19, art. 8. For a judicial confirmation of the continuity of the common law in the 
HKSAR, see HKSAR v. Ma Wai-Kwan, David & others [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761, 774-75, 
789, 790 (C.A.). Note that the expression, "previously in force in Hong Kong," should not 
be construed to exclude post-1997 developments in customary international law, given the 
progressive nature of the incorporation rule, which is received into the local system through 
the application of the common law. Accordingly, where under the common law a question 
is governed by international law, one must resort to customary international law as existing 
at the time the court renders its judgment. Support for such a construction of the incorpora-
tion rule can be drawn from the case of Standard Chartered Bank v. Int'l Tin Council 
[1987] 1 W.L.R. 641, 648 (referring to the "duty of English courts so far as possible to 
keep in step with the settled practice of other nations"). 
37. It is a moot question whether local judges will follow the emphatic statement of 
Lord Dening that "[international law knows no rule of stare decisis," and, therefore, the 
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from applying customary rules rejected by English courts because they con-
tradict English legislation. A constrictive approach along these lines, how-
ever, would not seem compatible with the dynamic nature of international 
law and the Territory's obligation to observe international law. Although 
international law does not demand automatic incorporation of custom by 
municipal law, a noted international jurist has observed that, subject to dif-
fering internal constitutional or statutory provisions regarding priority, in-
ternational law is "everywhere part of the law of the land" and "there is not a 
legal system in the world where international law is treated as a foreign 
law."38 
Regardless of its mode or route of reception—and whether it is an inte-
gral part of the law of the land—customary international law is doubtless 
one of the sources of the Territory's law. Thus, local judges should draw 
upon such laws in exercising their duty to interpret and apply the law and to 
fill any gaps in that law. In adopting such a "moderate"39 approach, the local 
judiciary may rely on support from their Australian counterparts, who have 
reaffirmed in numerous decisions that customary international law is an im-
portant source of the domestic law40 and "a legitimate influence on the de-
velopment of the common law by the courts."41 
courts "must discover what the prevailing international rule is and apply that rule," imple-
menting any changes in international law "without waiting for the House of Lords to do it." 
See Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, 365-66. 
Note in this connection the section introduced in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996, eliminating qualification on incorporation by reason of judicial precedent: 
"32. Customary international law is the law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament." 
38. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Relationship Between International and Regional Hu-
man Rights Norms and Domestic Law, 1992 COMMONWEALTHL. BULL. 1268. 
39. See Shearer, supra note 25, at 15, for the view that such an approach is 
more in keeping with the harmonisation approach to the incorporation of inter-
national law into domestic law than an unqualified automatic incorporation doc-
trine. For it allows the judges, within the leeway of judicial choice allowed to 
them, to fill gaps and adapt the existing law in harmony with international law in 
a way that is adapted to the particular circumstances. 
40. Sir Owen Dixon originally expressed this proposition in Chow Hung Ching v. The 
King (1948) 15 I.L.R. 147, 169, and is widely accepted among the Australian judiciary. See 
Report of the Australian Branch to the International Law Association Committee on Inter-
national Law in National Courts, reprinted in AUSTL. Y.B. INT 'LL. 231, 234-37 (1994). 
41. See Shearer, supra note 25, at 14 (citing Sir Anthony Mason [former Chief Justice 
of Australia], 77ie Influence of International and Transnational Law on Australian Domes-
tic Law, 7 PUB. L. REV. 20 (1996)). See also recent cases in the High Court of Australia: 
Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501 (involving war crimes), Mabo v. 
Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (involving rights of indigenous people), and Capital Tele-
vision Party Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (involving political advertising). 
But see a concluding observation that a local expert made with regard to the "watering 
down" by Hong Kong courts of the international and comparative materials to "fit into the 
more conservative common law framework," rather than "widening the frontiers of the 
common law," Johannes MM. Chan, The Influence of International and Comparative Ju-
risprudence on the Interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, Paper Presented at the 
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By the same token, a successful incorporation of customary interna-
tional law into the local law hinges to a large extent on the courts effectively 
ascertaining the relevant rules. Such a task is by no means easy, given the 
problems intrinsic to customary international law, including (1) the difficul-
ties encountered in determining the existence of rules of customary interna-
tional law,42 (2) their commonly vague formulation (often taking the form of 
permissions rather than mandatory rules), and (3) their occasional inappro-
priateness to cases involving individuals (as distinct from those involving 
States).43 
Specifically, the dispute often surrounding international customary rules 
tends to reinforce parochial tendencies and deter exploration of unfamiliar 
territory. Whether by misplaced emphasis on the doctrine of precedent or by 
virtue of judges' legitimate device of classification,44 artificially constructed 
decisions that fail to give proper recognition to the applicable international 
rule may follow.45 
In principle, however, all national courts are "competent to decide 
questions of customary international law. . . having regard, in addition to 
their inherent knowledge of international law (jura novit curia),"6 to the ju-
Conference on Constitutions in an Interdependent World: The Impact of Internationaliza-
tion on Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region, held in Macau, Nov. 18-20, 1996, at 29. 
42. Particularly cumbersome is the requirement for evidence of "general practice ac-
cepted as law" {opinio juris), set forth in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (involving a subjective element of belief that there exists a legal obligation to 
act). 
43. As may be inferred from J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade & Indus. 
(International Tin Council Case) [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418, 500 (Eng. H.L.), incorporation of 
customary international law does not necessarily mean that rights granted under such law 
can be enforced directly in municipal courts. Rather, enforcement will occur only if spe-
cifically provided for under the rule in question. See also the observation that "customary 
international law confers none or only the rarest of rights on individuals; accordingly, indi-
viduals will seldom, if ever, be in a position to rely on customary law in an English court." 
Colin Warbrick, The Theory of International Law: Is there an English Contribution?, in 
PERESTROIKA & INT'L L. 49 (W.E. Butler ed., Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publications 
1990). 
44. See, for example, Lord Templeman's characterization in the International Tin 
Council Case, 2 App. Cas. at 513, "a short question of construction of the plain words of a 
statutory instrument," contrasted with Judge Kerr's classification in the Court of Appeal of 
the case as one about the status and powers of an international organization, so that "the 
logical starting point must be international law." [1988] 3 All. E.R. 257, 275 (C.A.). 
45. See Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No. 3) [1991] 1 All. E.R. 871 (H.L.) (ruling 
that, although the Arab Monetary Fund, as an international organization created under in-
ternational law, could not be accorded legal status in the U.K., it may be recognized as a 
legal person [in line with domestic conflict of law rules] by virtue of its status under the 
domestic law of another State [UAE]). 
46. As noted earlier, international law is not regarded as "foreign law"; hence, no 
proof or expert evidence is normally required. Nonetheless, doubts have been raised as to 
"whether the maxim jura novit curia is in fact justified or sufficient in practice." Specifi-
cally, "[a]re there circumstances in which national courts should be encouraged to seek ex-
pert opinions on international law ex proprio motu, to request amicus curiae briefs, or to 
ask for (binding or non-binding) advisory opinions from international bodies?" See ILA 
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rispradence of international courts and tribunals, of national courts in other 
States, and to the writings of scholars, as contained in textbooks, commen-
taries, digests, and articles in learned journals."47 Needless to say, a legal 
profession versed in international law48 and the availability of relevant inter-
national materials would greatly assist judges. 
B. Conventional International Law 
Hong Kong's judicial practice in applying treaties in the Territory has 
followed the basic premise of British constitutional law that treaties are in-
capable of constituting a rule of law for the courts in the absence of legisla-
tive implementation.4' As early as 1880, the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, 
sitting as a full court in the Status of the French Mail Steamers case,50 re-
jected an attempt to distinguish the position of Hong Kong with respect to 
the domestic application of treaties because of its status as a Crown Colony. 
The Court relied on the Parliament Beige case to affirm that "no treaty by 
the Queen with a foreign Power can affect the rights and privileges of the 
Queen's subjects within Hong Kong except under the sanction of an Act of 
Parliament or of a local ordinance or probably an order of the Queen in 
Council."51 
More recently, the rule that domestic courts will not enforce obligations 
and rights under international treaties unless incorporated into the local law 
was restated by the Privy Council in the celebrated case of Winfat Enter-
prises (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General of Hong Kong.51 The appellants in 
that case challenged the Hong Kong government's refusal to issue a building 
permit as contrary to the terms of the Peking Convention of 1898. Their ap-
peal was dismissed by the Privy Council, which held that the stipulation 
against expropriation contained in a bilateral treaty such as the 1898 Peking 
Convention could not create rights enforceable by individuals in municipal 
courts. Equally unsuccessful were bids to rely on the 1898 Convention to 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
47. See id. at 14-15. 
48. Chan, supra note 41, at 4 n.13 (citing [H.K.] LAW REFORM COMMISSION'S 
CONSULTATION PAPER ON EXTRINSIC MATERIALS AS AN AID TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
para. 10.22 (1996) ("[W]hile practitioners and judges had adapted relatively quickly to ac-
cessing and understanding international materials, 'it would seem that only a small number 
of lawyers have familiarised themselves adequately with the materials.'")). 
49. As emphatically restated by Lord Oliver in International Tin Council Case, 2 App. 
Cas. at 500, "[a] treaty is not part of English law unless and until it has been incorporated 
into the law by legislation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res inter alios acta 
from which they cannot derive rights and by which they cannot be deprived of rights or 
subject to obligations." 
50. Geoffrey Marston, Unincorporated Treaties and Colonial Law—Hong Kong's 
"Parliament Beige," 20 H.K. L.J. 178, 187-90 (1990) (citing THE DAILY PRESS, Jan. 12, 
1880). 
51. Id. at 189 (per Smale L.J.) (citing The Parliament Beige, 4 P.D. 129 (CA. 1879)). 
52. [1985] 1 App. Cas. 733 (1988) 77 INT'L L.R. 376. 
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grant mainland Chinese a right of way or a license to enter Hong Kong53 and 
to oust jurisdiction of local courts over an area in the City of Kowloon.54 
Also regarded as "not justiciable" is the 1984 Sino-British Joint Decla-
ration (and its Annexes), which the High Court held not to have been incor-
porated into the local law." The Court held that neither the Hong Kong Act 
1985 nor the Application of English Law Ordinance bestowed upon the 
Joint Declaration the force of law in Hong Kong. In a similar case involving 
a claim based on a provision in Annex II of the Joint Declaration, the Court 
ruled that the government's announced intention to implement the Accord 
had not given rise to a justiciable legitimate expectation. Specifically, the 
Court held that the applicant's Crown lease would be renewed in accordance 
with the relevant provision.56 Arguably, however, the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration is incorporated into the local law by the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR. As set forth in the Joint Declaration,57 this Law gives domestic le-
gal effect to the PRC's policies on Hong Kong in accordance with state-
ments and elaborations made under the Sino-British agreement.58 
Indeed, the incorporation of a treaty may take a variety of forms. Most 
commonly, a direct mode is employed, whereby a treaty becomes an integral 
part of the legislation itself (for example, by inclusion in a schedule attached 
to the statute).59A treaty may also be incorporated indirectly or by reference 
either by mention in the statute60 or by adducing extrinsic evidence to show 
53. See decision by Magistrate D'Almada Remedies in Lau Hong-chung & others, in 
Cynthia Chan, Entry Right Ruled Out for Illegals, S.C.M.P., Sept. 20,1990. 
54. See Fung Yuen Mui v. Chan Kam Yee (H.C.) [1991] 1 H.K.C. 462 (courts gener-
ally take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in domestic law). 
55. Tang Ping-hoi v. Attorney Gen. [1987] H.K.L.R. 324, 329. 
56. See The Home Restaurant Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. [1987] H.K.L.R. 237, 247. Con-
trast with the decision of the High Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration v. Teoh 
(1994-95) 183 C.L.R. 273, that a ratified but unincorporated treaty raised a "legitimate ex-
pectation" in Australian citizens and residents that its provisions would be taken into ac-
count by decision-makers in exercising their powers. 
57. Sino-British Joint Declaration, art. 3(12), supra note 18. 
58. Note the recent judicial pronouncements in HKSAR v. Ma Wai-Kwan, David & 
others [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761, 775, 803-04 (C.A.) (respectively) by Chief Judge Chan (that 
the Joint Declaration is to be used as an "aid to the interpretation of the Basic Law") and by 
Vice-President Mortimer (that in the construction of the Basic Law, assistance should be 
sought from the Joint Declaration in cases of real ambiguity, given that the Joint Declara-
tion was the Basic Law's genesis). 
59. See, for example, the Carriage By Air (Overseas Territories) Order No. 809 LAWS 
OF HONG KONG, app. Ill (1967), setting forth in Schedule 1 the 1929 Warsaw Convention 
and Additional Protocol on Unification of Certain Rules Relative to International Carriage 
by Air. 
60. See, for example, the Internationally Protected Persons and Taking of Hostages 
Ordinance (No. 20 of 1995), 34 LAWS OF HONG KONG, cap. 468, which states the following 
in the preamble: "An Ordinance to provide for the implementation of both the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, in-
cluding Diplomatic Agents and the International Convention against the Taking of Hos-
tages." See also the "long title" of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, 30 LAWS OF 
HONG KONG, cap. 383 ("An Ordinance to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong 
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that the statute was designed to incorporate the treaty.61 While all treaties 
that have been incorporated become part of the law of the land, and hence 
justiciable in the courts of the land, "those that are incorporated in terms— 
by being appended to a Statute, and forming the substantive part of the Stat-
ute—have the most unequivocal status in domestic law."62 Still, in the Eng-
lish legal system, and in its Hong Kong counterpart, even fully incorporated 
treaties have no special position and enjoy no higher status than other legis-
lation.63 Hence, in line with the lex posterior rule of construction, a later 
statute on the same subject matter may prevail over an earlier one incorpo-
rating an international treaty. 
By the same token, local judges should not completely eschew refer-
ence to "unincorporated" treaties. As asserted by a renowned commentator, 
F.A. Mann, either because there can be no fear of conflict with the Execu-
tive ("speaking with two voices") or because the ultimate aim is to reach "a 
decision which protects this country against a possible breach of its interna-
tional duties," the principle that unincorporated treaties are not justiciable in 
English courts is no longer tenable.64 In fact, a substantial body of case law65 
is available to reinforce Mann's observation that, when the occasion or ne-
cessity arises, English courts are "in principle neither unable nor unwilling 
to look at, construe, and give effect to treaties which have not been adopted 
by Parliament."66 
Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to 
Hong Kong; and for ancillary and connected matters."). 
61. See, for example, Nuclear Material (Liability for Carriage) Ordinance (No. 45 of 
1995) 36 LAWS OF HONG KONG, cap. 479, which contains reference to agreements concern-
ing "third-party liability in the field of nuclear energy" applicable to Hong Kong (such as 
the 1960 Convention and 1964 Additional Protocol on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy). 
62. Rosalyn Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 
129 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelly Roberts eds., London: Sweet & Maxwell 1987). 
63. It is commonly perceived that under British constitutional doctrines no 
"entrenchment" of laws is possible. It may be pointed out, however, that the U.K. Parlia-
ment had legislated in the past to divest itself of sovereignty (e.g., Statute of Westminster 
1931, § 4, 22d23 Geo. 5c.4., 7 HALSBURY'S STATUTES (4th ed.); European Communities Act 
1972, §§ 2(1), 2(4), 1972 c.68, 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES (4th ed.); and, as observed by 
Lord Denning, has not subsequently endeavored to reclaim it ("freedom once conferred 
cannot be revoked") Blackburn v. Attorney Gen. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037,1040). 
64. See F.A. MANN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS 94-104 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1986). See also Higgins, supra note 62, at 127, for the view that "[a]n unincorporated 
treaty can always be looked at, so long as rights of individuals are not founded upon it 
alone and so long as it is not suggested that it takes away rights existing under common 
law." 
65. For an account of recent cases, see Christopher Staker, Decisions of British Courts 
During 1993, BRITISH Y.B. INT'LL. 455-63 (1993). 
66. MANN, supra note 64, at 87. See also Robert Y. Jennings, An International Lawyer 
Takes Stock, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513, 525 (1990) (criticizing the rigidity reflected in 
Lord Oliver's speech in J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade & Indus. (International Tin 
Council Case) [1990] 2 App. Cas. 418 (Eng. H.L.) and repudiating any assumed "doctrine 
of unjusticiability of unincorporated treaties" as "contrary to precedent, to reason and to 
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Clearly, in relation to civil liberties, English judges have demonstrated 
a willingness to consider and be influenced by unincorporated international 
treaties, especially the European Convention on Human Rights.67 Admit-
tedly, approaches vary from judge to judge, and no consistent judicial view 
has emerged. Concurrent with similar trends in other jurisdictions, however, 
English judges will likely continue to resort to unincorporated international 
human rights treaties as an aid to statutory interpretation or when deciding 
uncertain points of common law.68 Reference to such treaties would pre-
sumably increase when such judges become aware of potential engagement 
of State responsibility.69 
Hong Kong's rather barren jurisprudential scene with respect to unin-
corporated treaties renders it somewhat difficult to draw solid conclusions. 
Attitudes displayed by the local courts range from wholesale rejection,70 to 
reserved acceptance,71 to susceptibility to the Territory's treaty obligations.72 
common sense"). 
67. See, for example, cases concerned with freedom of expression, cited in Staker, su-
pra note 65, at 455: Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (Nos. 1 & 2) [1987] 3 All. 
E.R. 316, [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109 (C.A.); Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers 
Ltd. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28; [1993] 2 W.L.R. 449 (H.L.); Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspa-
pers Ltd. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 953 (C.A.); Attorney Gen. v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1993] 
3 W.L.R. 74 (Q.B.D.); see also R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte 
Wynne [1993] 1 W.L.R. 11 (H.L.) (right to a fair and public hearing); and R. v. Brown 
[1993] 2 W.L.R. 556 (H.L.) (right to respect for private and family life). 
68. See infra note 95. 
69. See, e.g., R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Phansopkar [1976] 1 
Q.B. 606 (suggesting that it was the duty of U.K. courts to have regard to the unincorpo-
rated European Convention on Human Rights when interpreting and applying statute and 
common law); Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 App. Cas. 109, 
283-84 (per Lord Goff: "I conceive it to be my duty, when I am free to do so, to interpret 
the law in accordance with the obligations of the Crown under this treaty [the European 
Convention on Human Rights]"); Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 
[1992] 3 W.L.R. 28 (The court is under a duty to decide uncertain questions of common 
law in a manner consistent with the European Convention.). 
70. See R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Li Jin-fei & others (1993) H.K.P.L.R. 
565, 575 ("[I]t is axiomatic that the municipal courts of the territory do not exist for the en-
forcement of international obligations incurred by the United Kingdom Government on be-
half of Hong Kong."). 
71. See readiness exhibited by Mayo, J. in R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Li 
Jin-fei & others (1993) 3 H.K.P.L.R. 552, to consider the "issue of Statelessness" under the 
unincorporated 1954 360 U.N.T.S. 117 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Per-
sons (subsequently rebuked in the Court of Appeal, id. at 576, 578, as "misplaced"; note, in 
particular, the observation by Litton, J.A. that "the [H.C.] judge was lured into a blind alley 
in which the issue of Statelessness became, in effect, litigated"). See also Tang Ping-hoi v. 
Attorney Gen. [1987] H.K.L.R. 324. It may be inferred (upon a most liberal construction of 
the judgment) that, had evidence of "intention to give the Joint Declaration the force of 
law" been more convincing, a claim based on "legitimate expectations" would have re-
ceived a more favorable consideration. 
72. See R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Simon Yin Xiang-jiang (1994) 4 
H.K.P.L.R. 265, 273 (per Bokhary J.A.): 
Naturally, it is not to be assumed that Hong Kong has no respect at all for its 
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On occasion, judges have even relied on treaties that have not been extended 
to Hong Kong,73 without offering any epistemological illumination, such as 
the declaratory nature of the treaty. A reasonable conclusion is that Hong 
Kong's judiciary has yet (1) to overcome its cultural resistance to interna-
tional law in general and (2) to adopt the declared principle of common-
wealth law that "[i]t is within the proper nature of the judicial process and 
well-established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to in-
ternational obligations which a country undertakes—whether or not they 
have been incorporated into domestic law—for the purpose of removing 
ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or common 
law."74 
Should the need arise to construe the terms of a treaty that is binding on 
the Territory,75 Hong Kong judges clearly are expected to apply international 
rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vi-
treaty obligations, especially those pertaining to fundamental human rights of an 
international dimension. It is at least potentially arguable, therefore, that where 
Hong Kong has a treaty obligation not to expel Stateless persons except on 
grounds of national security or public order, then, even though that obligation 
has not be incorporated into our domestic law, it is nevertheless a factor which 
our immigration authorities ought to take into account when exercising a discre-
tion whether or not, in all the circumstances, to insist upon the departure from 
this territory of any Stateless person even though his departure is not required by 
national security or public order. 
See also Cheung Ng Sheong v. Eastweek Publishers Ltd. (1995) 5 H.K.P.L.R. 428, 437 (per 
Nazareth V.P.: "I can see no reason, nor has any been brought to the attention of this Court, 
why we should not be free to interpret the law in accordance with treaty obligations apply-
ing to Hong Kong."). 
73. See, for example, references to "refugees" in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees in R. v. Director of Immigration and the Refugee 
Status Review Board, ex parte Do Giau & others [1992] H.K.L.R. 287, R. v. Director of 
Immigration, ex parte Le Tu Phuong & others (1993) 3 H.K.P.L.R. 641. Note, however, 
that under a Statement of Understanding reached between the Hong Kong Government and 
U.N.H.C.R. Concerning the Treatment of Asylum Seekers Arriving from Vietnam in Hong 
Kong (Sept. 1988), the Hong Kong Government "further reaffirms its undertaking that the 
determination of refugee status will be in accordance with the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and U.N.H.C.R. guidelines." See also dictum in 
Nguyen Tuan Cuong & others v. Director of Immigration & others (P.C.) (1996) 7 
H.K.P.L.R. 19, 32, that the partial acceptance of the Refugee Convention underlies the 
relevant statutory provisions (in the Immigration Ordinance) and "makes it necessary to 
examine their background in international law." 
74. Bangalore Principles, prin. 4, reprinted in 14 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1196 
(1988). The Bangalore Principles have been reaffirmed successively by the Harare Decla-
ration of Human Rights (1989), reprinted in COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, DEVELOPING 
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (London: Interights 1992); The Banjul Affirmation (1990), 
reprinted in COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
(London: Interights 1992), and The Abuja Confirmation (1991), reprinted in COM-
MONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (London: Interights 
1992). 
75. Arguably, no distinction should be drawn between interpretation of incorporated 
and unincorporated treaties since, as instruments created within the system of public inter-
national law, all treaties should be interpreted in accordance with the rules of that system. 
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enna Convention on the Law of Treaties.76 In embracing such an interna-
tional legal approach, local courts would be supported by a considerable 
number of authoritative English decisions and by the jurisprudence of courts 
in many other States.77 The courts should garner particular reinforcement 
from the House of Lords' landmark judgments in James Buchanan v. Babco 
Forwarding™ and Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines™ subsequently endorsed 
in several cases.80 As reasoned by Lord Diplock, 
[t]he language of an international convention has not been chosen by an 
English Parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conven-
tional English legislative idiom nor designed to be construed exclusively 
by English judges. It is addressed to a much wider and more varied judi-
cial audience than is an Act of Parliament... It should be interpreted as 
Lord Wilberforce put it. . . "unconstrained by technical rules of English 
law, or by English precedent, but on broad principles of general accepta-
tion."81 
Thus, since international courts and tribunals refer to travaux prepara-
tories as an aid to interpretation and 
this practice as regards national courts has not been confirmed by the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties82... where the text is ambigu-
76. Note that, although the 1969 Convention has not been incorporated into the do-
mestic legislation, its status as customary international law renders it part of Hong Kong 
law. 
77. See, e.g., Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Gamlen Chem. Co. (Australia) Pty Ltd. 
(1980) 147 C.L.R. 142, 159 (H.C.) (laying down the rule that when Australian courts are 
applying the text of a treaty, incorporated by statute into national law, the courts must ap-
ply international law rules of interpretation, not municipal rules of statutory interpretation), 
and Commonwealth of Australia v. Tasmania (H.C.) (1983) 68 I.L.R. 266, 303 (having ac-
cepted that the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties was declaratory of customary in-
ternational law, the court applied the Convention to ascertain the meaning of provisions in 
the Treaty of World Heritage); in Canada, In re Regina & Palacios (Ont. C.A.) (1984) 45 
O.R.2d 269 (cited in HUGH M. KINDRED ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTER-
PRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 183-84 (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications 5th 
ed. 1993)) (holding that the rules of public international law, not domestic law, govern the 
interpretation of a statute incorporating a treaty, and hence the court is not bound by the 
common law canon of literal construction); in Israel, Attorney Gen. of the Government of 
Israel v. Eichmann (Jeru. D.C. 1961) 36 INT'L L.R. 5 (applying international rules to the 
interpretation of a domestic law which did not incorporate an international treaty but was 
inspired by it). 
78. [1978] App. Cas. 141. 
79. Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd. [1981] App. Cas. 251. 
80. See, e.g., R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Read [1989] 1 App. Cas. 1014; IRC v. 
Commerzbank [1990] S.T.C. 285; Hiscox v. Outhwaite [1992] 1 App. Cas. 562; Antwerp 
United Diamond v. Air Eur. [1993] 4 All. E.R. 469; Abnett v. British Airways, T.L.R., June 
22, 1995. 
81. Fothergill, App. Cas. at 281-82 (quoting Buchanan v. Babco Forwarding [1978] 
App. Cas. 141,152). 
82. While noting that the Vienna Convention applies only to treaties concluded after it 
came into force, Lord Diplock reaffirmed that "what it says in Articles 31 and 32 about in-
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ous or obscure, an English court should have regard to any material 
which the delegates themselves had thought would be available to clear 
up any possible ambiguities or obscurities. Indeed, in the case of Acts of 
Parliament giving effect to international conventions concluded after the 
coming into force of [die Vienna Convention], I think an English court 
might well be under a constitutional obligation to do so.83 
Notwithstanding (1) the lack of explicit and systematic application of 
the "Vienna rules" by English courts and (2) the emergence of no categorical 
prescription of reference to international rules of treaty interpretation,84 the 
international approach appears to be the most appropriate. The application of 
international norms and practices assumes added pertinence when a treaty 
that requires interpretation aims at achieving international legislative uni-
formity.85 As cogently expressed in the judgment of the Cor de Cassation of 
Belgium, 
[t]he interpretation of an international convention, the purpose of which 
is the unification of law, cannot be done by reference to the domestic law 
of one of the contracting States. If the treaty text calls for interpretation, 
this ought to be done on the basis of elements that actually pertain to the 
treaty, notably its object, its purpose, and its context, as well as its pre-
paratory work and genesis. The purpose of drawing up an international 
convention, designed to become a species of international legislation, 
will be wholly frustrated if the courts of each State were to interpret it in 
accordance with concepts that are specific to their own legal system.M 
terpretation of treaties . . . does not more than codify already-existing public international 
law." Id. at 283. 
83. Id. It may be pointed out that, at the time the Lords pronounced upon the permis-
sibility of using the travaux preparatoires of a treaty as an aid to interpretation, a U.K. 
court could not have had regard for the legislative history of "ordinary" acts of Parliament 
when interpreting their terms. But see Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1992] 3 W.L.R. 
1033 (allowing relaxation of the rule excluding reference to Parliamentary material as an 
aid to statutory construction). 
84. For an analysis and criticism of the "lack of intellectual coherence" and the 
"cherry-picking" nature of references to isolated elements of the Vienna rules, see Richard 
Gardinar, Treaty Interpretation in the English Courts Since Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines 
(1980), 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 620, 628 (1995). 
85. Notable examples include the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air L.N.T.S., vol. 137, at 11 [U.S.T.S. 
876], as amended by the 1955 Hague Protocol. See strong reaffirmation by the House of 
Lords in Sidhu & others v. British Airways pic; Abnett (known as Skyes) v. Same, Times L. 
Rep., Dec. 13, 1996 (per Lord Hope: "[T]he language used [in the Warsaw Convention] and 
the subject matter with which it dealt demonstrated that what was sought to be achieved 
was a uniform international code, which could be applied by the courts of the contracting 
parties without reference to the rules of their own domestic law." The court concluded that, 
where the Convention as a "set of uniform rules" did not provide a remedy, no remedy was 
available.). 
86. Tondriau v. Air India (1977) (cited in S.S. Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Quantas 
Airways (N.S.W. C.A.) [1991] 1 LLOYD'S REP. 288 (affirming the importance of ap-
proaching construction of international instruments attached to a statute while keeping in 
mind their international character and the desirability so far as possible that they should be 
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By the same token, where treaties are not concerned with promoting 
uniform legislation, their uniform interpretation is not an end in itself. Ulti-
mately, the treaty (and the statute designed to implement it) should be inter-
preted in "good faith . . . in light of its object and purpose."87 Thus, for ex-
ample, international human rights treaties should be given a generous and 
purposive construction compatible with their aim to protect fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Generally, judges should "avoid parochial construc-
tions which are uninformed (or ill-informed) about the jurisprudence that 
has gathered around [the relevant international instruments]."88 In addition, 
judges should have regard for judicial decisions of international courts and 
courts in other countries and to the respective "teachings of highly qualified 
publicists."89 
Still, local judges have been slow to shake off parochial tendencies, 
even when faced with the need to construe uniform treaties90 and notwith-
standing specific encouragement by the legislature to explore international 
sources.91 In particular, expectations—arising from the "growing tendency 
for national courts to have regard for [international norms of human 
rights]"92 and the relevant international jurisprudence93—have not been fully 
given a consistent construction by the courts of the several contracting States)). 
87. 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, U.N. 
Doc.A/CONF. 39/27. 
88. S.S. Pharmaceutical, 1 LLOYD'S REP. 88. In that case, judges consulted (in aid of 
interpreting disputed provisions of the Warsaw Convention) decisions of courts from Ar-
gentina, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, India, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The courts referred to manuals of author-
ity on international air law and articles in international legal journals. 
89. Note that, under article 38(l)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (the "sources of international law"), "judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" 
are to be applied as "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 
90. See, e.g., Ka Da Watch Co. Ltd. v. Skyworld Air Express Ltd. (C.A.) [1991] 
H.K.C. 184 (adopting interpretation of the Warsaw Convention set out in Schedule 1 to the 
Carriage By Air (Overseas Territories) Order 1967, LAWS OF HONG KONG, supra note 59, as 
provided in an English case without undertaking an independent interpretation nor dis-
playing awareness that international rules of interpretation should apply); Manohar t/a Vi-
namito Trading House v. Hill & Delamain (H.K.) Ltd. (C.A.) [1993] 2 H.K.C. 342 
(alluding to the Warsaw Convention but proceeding to interpret the term "carriage by air" 
without any reference to the Vienna rules or to the need to apply international rules to 
maintain uniformity). 
91. See Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) 25 LAWS OF HONG KONG, which, apart from 
reproducing the UNCITRAL Model Law in Schedule 5, provides in Section 2(3) the fol-
lowing: "In interpreting and applying the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, regard 
should be had to its international origin and to the need for uniformity in its interpretation, 
and regard may be had to the documents specified in the Sixth Schedule." Analytical 
Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Sixth 
Schedule, Report of the Secretary General, Mar. 25, 1985, U.N. Doc A/C N9; Report of the 
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its 18th Session (emphasis 
added). To allow reference to case law of other States, a list of signatories is also annexed 
to the Ordinance. 
92. Bangalore Principles, prin. 4, supra note 74. 
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substantiated. Commentators have observed that the initial "enthusiasm" and 
"receptiveness to international standards" have "flowed and ebbed."94 The 
"high water mark" is invariably traced to the forceful pronouncement by 
Silke, V.P. in R. v. Sin Yau-ming:9i 
In my judgment, the glass through which we view the interpretation of 
the Hong Kong Bill is a glass provided by the Covenant. We are no 
longer guided by the ordinary canons of constructions of statutes nor with 
the dicta of the common law inherent in our training. We must look in 
our interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill, at the aims of the Covenant and 
give "full recognition and effect" to die statement which commences mat 
Covenant. From this stems die entirely new jurisprudential approach to 
which I have already referred... While mis court is, in effect, required 
to make new Hong Kong law relating to the manner of interpretation of 
the Hong Kong Bill and consequentially fiie tests to be applied to those 
laws now existing and, when asked, those laws yet to be enacted, we are 
not wiUiout guidance in our task. This can be derived from decisions 
taken in common law jurisdictions which contain a constitutionally en-
trenched Bill of Rights. We can also be guided by decisions of the Euro-
pean Court and the European Human Rights Commission—"the Com-
mission." Further, we can bear in mind me comments and decisions of 
me United Nations Human Rights Committee—"die Committee." I 
would hold none of uaese to be binding upon us mough in so far as Uiey 
reflect the interpretation of articles in die Covenant, and are directly re-
lated to Hong Kong legislation, I would consider mem as of the greatest 
93. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, J. [former President of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal, currently of the Australian High Court], The Australian Use of International Hu-
man Rights Norms from Bangalore to Balliol—A View from the Antipodes, 1992 
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1306, 1322 (highlighting the "rapid progress" and "firm footing" 
of the "Bangalore ideas" in Australia's appellate courts, notwithstanding the strength of 
earlier legal authority; the high conservatism of the judiciary in matters of basic principle; 
the features of provincialism, which are almost inescapable in a legal system now largely 
isolated from its original sources; the absence of an indigenous Bill of Rights to provide a 
vehicle for international developments; and the special problems of a Federal State where 
many matters relevant to fundamental rights still rest within the legislative powers of the 
States). For numerous references to international conventions and comparative jurispru-
dence by Canadian courts, see ANN F. BAYEFSKY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: USE 
IN CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION (Butterworths 1992). For ex-
amples of an increased judicial reference to international standards following the enactment 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990, see Parkhill v. Ministry of Transport [1992] 
1 N.Z.L.R. 555 (C.A.); Noort v. Ministry of Transport [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 743 (C.A.); R. v. 
Goodwin [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 153 (C.A.); TV3 Network Ltd. v. Eveready N.Z. Ltd. [1993] 3 
N.Z.L.R. 435 (C.A.). See also citations from court practices in Namibia South Africa and 
Zimbawe in John Dugard, The Role of International Law in Interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 208, 211-12 (1994). 
94. See Andrew Byrnes, Killing It Softly? The Hong Kong Courts and the Slow Demise 
of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, in HONG KONG AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS 33-43 (proceedings of a seminar or-
ganized by the Centre for Comparative and Public Law Faculty of Law, University of Hong 
Kong Sept. 30, 1995). For a more recent assessment, see Chan, supra note 41, concluding 
that "[o]n the whole, international and comparative materials have only had limited impact 
on the interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights." 
95. R v. Sin Yau-ming [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 127, 141. 
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assistance and give to them considerable weight. 
Setting forth a more specific approach to the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights Ordinance, Justice Silke cited Lord Wilberforce's famous dictum in 
Ministry of Home Affairs v. Fisher.™ Specifically, he cited the proposition 
that a constitutional document like the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) 
calls for a "generous interpretation, avoiding what has been called the 
'austerity of legalism,' suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms" contained therein. The justice has also 
echoed (without explicit mention of the Vienna Convention) the interna-
tional rules of treaty interpretation, highlighting the necessity to regard the 
"context of the Covenant and its aims and objects, with a bias towards the 
interests of the individual."97 
One commentator has, nonetheless, suggested that Silke's determined 
"internationalist" approach was somewhat tempered by concern for local 
practical feasibility, and that the judgment was a "creative blend of interna-
tional human rights law and common law pragmatism."98 Indeed, whether 
because of "common law chauvinism"99 or a perception of the BORO as 
mere statutory reaffirmation of fundamental rights long recognized under the 
common law,100 Hong Kong's judges have been keen to "stress the compati-
bility of their decisions with the common law as it existed prior to the pas-
sage of [the BORO]."101 Evidently, to the extent that the common law re-
96. [1980] App. Cas. 319 (P.C.) (concerning the Constitution of Bermuda, which, as 
emphasized by Lord Wilberforce, had been influenced by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Canadian and South Afri-
can courts cited the dictum with approval. See Dugard, supra note 93, at 212 n.27. See also 
R. v. Town Planning Board, ex parte Auburntown Ltd. (1994) 4 H.K.P.L.R. 194, 229 
(H.C.). 
97. Sin Yau-ming, 1 H.K.C.L.R. at 145. 
98. Richard Swede, One Territory—Three Systems? The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 44 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358, 367 (1995). 
99. This is a term used by Byrnes, supra note 94. See also Chan's discussion of the 
"common law superiority syndrome," supra note 41, at 6-9. 
100. See, e.g., Chim Shing Chung v. Commissioner of Correctional Servs. (1996) 6 
H.K.P.L.R. 313, 322 (per Litton V.P.: "It rarely happens that the Bill of Rights operates in 
an area of human activities not already covered by the laws of Hong Kong [that is, the 
common law, the rules of equity, and statute law]"). 
101. See Swede, supra note 98, at 368 (citing as examples the following cases: R v. 
Sin Yau-ming [1992] 1 H.K.C. 127, 141; R. v. William Hung [1992] H.K.P.L.R. 49, R. v. 
Wong Cheung-bun [1992] H.K.C.L.R. 240; R. v. Kevin Barry Egan [1991] 1 H.K.C. 284); 
and, the more recent case, R. v. Town Planning Board, ex parte The Real Estate Developers 
Association of H.K. (1996) 6 H.K.P.L.R. 179, 214 (per Leonard J.): 
The fact is that the common law affords ample protection for citizens . . . the 
most important effect. . . of the BORO Ordinance is that it puts an obstacle, 
even if it be not insurmountable in the way of any legislature which seeks to re-
move those rights protected both by the Common Law and the BORO Ordi-
nance. An argument based on the rules of natural justice which will not succeed 
on the basis of the Common Law is unlikely to be improved by the invocation of 
the Bill of Rights Ordinance. 
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fleets universal notions of justice and rule of law, conclusions reached in the 
light of principles of domestic case law often coincide with international 
standards. However, where incongruous with international law and jurispru-
dence, when lagging behind international legal developments,102 or in the ab-
sence of well-settled principles,103 the common law approach may thwart the 
BORO's stated objective of implementing the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.104 
Unfortunately, local provincial tendencies seem to have been reinforced 
following the Privy Council decision in Attorney General v. Lee Kwong-
kut/Attorney General v. Lo Chak-man.l0S The Council reaffirmed the princi-
ple that the BORO should be given a "generous and purposive construction" 
and acknowledged the "valuable guidance as to the proper approach to the 
interpretation of the Hong Kong Bill" provided by "decisions in other com-
mon law jurisdictions, including the United States and Canada, and of the 
European Court of Human Rights." Their Lordships then reminded the Ter-
ritory's courts that "decisions in other jurisdictions are persuasive and not 
binding authority and that the situation in those jurisdictions may not neces-
sarily be identical to that in Hong Kong."106 The Council sounded a further 
general caution that 
[wjhile the Hong Kong judiciary should be zealous in upholding an indi-
vidual's rights under the Hong Kong Bill, it is also necessary to ensure 
that disputes as to the effect of the Bill are not allowed to get out of 
hand. The issues involving the Hong Kong Bill should be approached 
with realism and good sense, and kept in proportion. If this is not done 
the Bill will become a source of injustice rather than justice and it will be 
debased in the eyes of the public. In order to maintain the balance be-
102. For example, such lagging occurs in the areas of substantive guarantees of equal 
protection of the law, right to a speedy trial, and the guarantee of an independent and im-
partial trial. See Andrew Byrnes, And Some Have Bills of Rights Thrust Upon Them: The 
Experience of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF 
RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Philip Alston ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, forth-
coming 1998). 
103. Arguably, where the common law is unsettled, the courts are required to decide 
cases in a manner consistent with the Convention as an international legal instrument 
(namely as an international court would have done). See Derbyshire County Council v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd. & Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 953 
(C.A.). 
104. See Byrnes, supra note 94, for an account of "cases in which the Bill of 
Rights/Letters Patent have been given an interpretation that is inconsistent with the inter-
national jurisprudence." Cf. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 42 (perBrennan, J.): 
The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but inter-
national law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the 
common law, especially when international law declares the existence of univer-
sal human rights. A common law doctrine founded on unjust discrimination in 
the enjoyment of civil and political rights demands reconsideration. 
105. (1993) 3 H.K.P.L.R. 72. 
106. Id. at 90-91 (per Lord Woolf). 
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tween the individual and the society as a whole, rigid and inflexible stan-
dards should not be imposed on die legislature's attempts to resolve the 
difficult and intransigent problems with which society is faced when 
seeking to deal widi serious crime. It must be remembered that questions 
of policy remain primarily the responsibility of the legislature.107 
Lord Woolf s observations have been respectfully endorsed in several 
cases,108 and appear to have given rise to a resurgence of the "domestic ap-
proach" to statutory interpretation, which pays insufficient regard to the in-
ternational origin of the BORO and its incorporating purpose. Thus, the 
Court of Appeal held that the BORO's provisions should be construed by 
the "well-known rules that apply to the interpretation of statutes" and that, 
"[i]n the absence of ambiguity or obscurity, it is neither necessary nor per-
missible to refer to matters extraneous to the Ordinance, like the terms of the 
Covenant or the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Pro-
visions in the ICCPR."109 In the appeal case of R v. Director of Immigration, 
ex parte Le Tu Phuong and another, the lower court judge was rebuked for 
determining standards of fairness without considering "what fairness re-
quired in the context of the Hong Kong statutory scheme and local condi-
tions."110 Appropriately depicted as the low tide in the receptiveness of Hong 
Kong courts to international standards, R v. Town Planning Board, ex parte 
Kwan Kong Co. Ltd.111 gives expression to the limited (and incorrect) view 
that 
[t]he court should intepret [the BORO] in the same way as it interprets 
any other ordinance of Hong Kong, namely, with established rules of in-
terpretation of the common law. The proper and primary judicial inter-
pretation of the Ordinance is by concentrating on die text of the Ordi-
nance and die language of the text.112 Even if the court should have resort 
to foreign jurisprudence, die court would not be justified in importing 
foreign autonomous meaning interpretation so as to contradict or arrive 
at an interpretation substantially different from die normal common law 
interpretation.113. . . therefore, unless someming overwhelming and 
compelling can be shown in any particular European authority, die Hong 
Kong court should very wisely decline to be seduced by me seemingly 
107. Id. at 100. 
108. See R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Wong King-lung & others/R v. Di-
rector of Immigration, ex parte So Kam-cheung & others/R. v. Director of Immigration, ex 
parte Lau Shek-to & others (1993) 3 H.K.P.L.R. 253, 275 (H.C.); R. v. Director of Immi-
gration, ex parte Hai Ho-tak/R v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Wong Chung-hing & 
others (1994) 4 H.K.P.L.R. 324, 336 (C.A.); R. v. To Kwan-hang and Tsoi Yiu-cheong 
(1994) 4 H.K.P.L.R. 356, 363 (C.A.). 
109. R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Hai Ho-tak, id. at 333-34 (per Nazareth 
J.A.) (emphasis added). 
110. [1994] 4 H.K.P.L.R. 339, 352. 
111. (1995)5H.K.P.L.R. 261. 
112. Id. at 300. 
113. Id. at 301. 
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inexhaustible literature from the European Court of Human Rights.114 
The local courts' narrowness of approach in interpreting the BORO also 
arises in (1) decisions regarding its applicability to the issues adjudicated115 
and (2) the inadequate acknowledgment of the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights' (CCPR's) effect as a normative source of public policy (by virtue 
of the well-established "compatibility rule"116 or the "harmonization ap-
proach").117 Anxious not to encroach on the "province of the legislature" by 
addressing policy questions, Hong Kong judges have declined to consider 
the binding nature of treaty commitments as a legally relevant component in 
the Territory's public policy.118 
Notwithstanding the lex specialis status of the BORO, and the CCPR 
standards imported through it, the customary international law of human 
rights has not been made redundant. Indeed, since most fundamental human 
rights antedate conventional instruments and are deemed general interna-
tional law,119 they form the ipso facto part of Hong Kong law.120 Conse-
114. Id. at 316. See also the support expressed by Leonard J. of Waung J.'s 
"reluctance . . . to indulge in 'judicial activism' which is apparent in several European de-
cisions [non-binding upon the H.K. court]." R. v. Town Planning Board, ex parte The Real 
Estate Developers Association (1996) 6 H.K.P.L.R. 179, 214. 
115. See, for example, determinations that the entitlements in the BORO are inappli-
cable to extradition proceedings in Ng Hung-yiu v. Government of the United States of 
America [1992] 2 H.K.L.R. 383 and ReSuthipong Smittachartch [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. 93. 
116. This is a rule of construction that the legislature is presumed not to have dero-
gated from the State's international obligations. Courts in both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions apply the "compatibility rule." See THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 
129 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelly Roberts eds., London: Sweet & Maxwell 1987). For a dis-
cussion of the implication of this rule for the Executive and the courts, see Andrew J. Cun-
ningham, The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary International Law and 
the Constitution 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 553ff (1994). 
117. See Shearer, supra note 25, at 10, for the view that such an approach impacts on 
all organs of the State (requiring the "passage of legislation to give effect to international 
law and to override inconsistent law, proper instructions to the executive arm of govern-
ment to be aware of the State's international obligations (e.g., in handling refugees), and 
efforts by the courts to interpret domestic law, whether statutory or unwritten, so far as 
possible in accordance with international law"). 
118. See R. v. Director of Immigration, ex parte Hai Ho-tak (1994) 4 H.K.P.L.R. 324, 
336 (CA.) (expressing concern as to the consequences of the Hong Kong Government's 
immigration policy and urging legislative reform); see also R. v. Director of Immigration, 
ex parte Wong King-lung & others (1993) 3 H.K.P.L.R. 253, 276 (H.C.) (per Jones, J. 
quoting the Privy Council's edict [in Lee Kwong-kut] that "questions of policy remain pri-
marily the responsibility of the legislature" but opining that "all right-thinking members of 
society will regard a policy that requires the removal of [young children] decidedly unat-
tractive and unworthy of a government that professes to support human rights"). Note 
that—following the Privy Council decision in Ming Pao Newspapers Limited v. The Attor-
ney Gen. of H.K. (1996) 6 H.K.P.L.R. 103, 105—Hong Kong judges may be encouraged to 
defer to local government's policies (e.g., with respect to the "pressing social need to stamp 
out the evil of corruption in Hong Kong"). See also critical commentary on "excessive def-
erence to Executive acts" by Chan, supra note 41, at 12-14. 
119. See Interim Report on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 
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quently, reference to pertinent international documents and jurisprudence 
should not be viewed as extraneous, nor should it be contingent on the am-
biguity or obscurity of domestic legislation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In exploring the possible pattern of the international/domestic law rela-
tionship in the HKSAR, the following may be concluded. Subject to the 
overarching limitation resulting from the exclusion of foreign and defense 
affairs from the Territory's control, the courts in the HKSAR are fully com-
petent to decide questions of international law that arise in the course of le-
gal proceedings. By virtue of the authority vested in them under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, the local courts are required to 
"adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the Region,"121 
including, when applicable, international law. Indeed, not only are judges 
authorized to apply international law, but they may also incur international 
responsibility for its misapplication. The duty thus imposed extends to judi-
cially reviewing Executive acts for conformity with the Territory's interna-
tional legal obligations and to interpreting HKSAR law consistent with in-
ternational law. 
Despite the superior ranking of the Basic Law within the domestic legal 
order—and regardless of whether an incorporationist attitude is adopted in 
relation to the status of international law in that order—the underlying prin-
ciples, widely shared among members of the international community, are 
those of compatibility and constitutionality. Thus, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of "international-law-friendliness"122 in the HKSAR Basic Law, when 
caught between the Scylla of domestic law (the Constitution) and the 
Charybdis of international law (pacta sunt servanda),123 HKSAR judges 
SIXTY-FIFTH CONFERENCE 446-59 (Cairo 1993), and references therein to State practice and 
scholarly writings. 
120. Note that, although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was held not to 
have the force of law in Hong Kong for the purpose of judicial review based on its provi-
sions, no consideration was given to the relevance of international norms embedded in the 
Declaration for purposes of statutory interpretation. See In re an Application by Wong 
Chun-Sing & Ng Fook-yin for Judicial Review [1984] H.K.L.R. 71. 
121. Basic Law, supra note 19, art. 84. 
122. Dermott J. Devine borrowed the concept from G. Erasmus to describe provisions 
in the South African Constitution that require judges to regard the applicable international 
law (e.g., in the areas of human rights observance, humanitarian law, and the use of force 
by States). See Dermott J. Devine, The Relationship Between International Law and Mu-
nicipal Law in the Light of the Interim South African Constitution 1993, 44 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1, 17 (1995). Note The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, § 233, Act 
No. 108 of 1996, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (Gisbet H. Flanz ed., 
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 1997), which stipulates that "[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every 
court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with in-
ternational law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international 
law." 
123. Devine, supra note 122, at 11 (citing C.R. Symmons, International Treaty Obli-
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should act upon the strong presumption that neither the Basic Law nor the 
legislature intends to violate international law. 
Judges applying international legal norms in the HKSAR courts are ex-
pected to follow patterns set by their local predecessors. Given the global 
trend of increased references to international law before national courts, 
however, the courts should adopt a more internationalist attitude, leading to 
the enrichment and the "internationalisation of the domestic law through the 
impact of international treaties, conventions, and standard-setting by inter-
national institutions."124 
gations and the Irish Constitution: The McGimpsey Case, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 310, 339 
(1992)). 
124. See Shearer, supra note 25, at 18. 
